Semantics in a holistic context --
with preliminary convictions and approaches

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ABSTRACT: The study of semantics is related to the study of human behavior. Understanding meaning requires an appreciation of cultural needs and differences. In these, the person is involved in understanding, recognizing, and reacting to personal-social situations and their contents. In this sense, person gets priority above logic, and meaning involves multiple relations to multiple components or complex situations.

Some of the starting points for such a view are best stated as beliefs, or convictions, about human nature, rather than as the result of "proving" them by logical argument. From such starting points, the person wishing to understand human nature can begin some approaches to his/her study.

CONVICTION I: MEANING REQUIRES THAT SOME PERSON BE INVOLVED.

We start with the belief that meaning is not something abstractly "floating in the sky", with no people around. Rather it somehow joins person to thing, person to situation, person to understanding--or failing to understand--some part of the world. There is an "outside" objective world to be observed--but it is known only when it is known, in part, to a person. As the philosopher Kant pointed out ([1985] 1938), years before I had independently stumbled on to that fact, we do not know the thing in itself, but in relation to an observer (with us as observers).

Conviction Ia: The person has (and in part comprises) a "self". One can choose, e.g., to write an article, or to discuss linguistic theory, or to forgive (or condemn) someone who has damaged him. Kearney, an

anthropologist, says (1954:68) that 'The first requirement for a world view is the presence of a *Self*--discernibly distinct from its environment, which I refer to as the *Other*.'

It is the presence of the self in relation to the world which allows us to have a holistic view of that world which includes us. Only a self can discuss such features as we are treating here. A shepherd dog can track a sheep much better than we can. But it does not write a book about it. And for a total holism (not a "fractionated" one), in my view, religion must enter in some way. A "secular" religion may assume that the self is somehow purely physical in its origin and outworking. A theistic view (which I hold) would treat the soul as distinct from body or mind, but integrating both in its decisions and actions. But, under any theory, it seems to me, the mind must somehow be given the power to influence body actions to some degree. Mind and body must both be included in a holistic approach to human behavior.

Conviction Ib: In order to understand an adult, the research scholar must in some sense first understand a child. It is the child, not the adult, who first learns through social interaction in a physical environment how to live in a culture. The Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev told me that the reason for their considering Danish important for them was that a person "learns his moral structure at his mother's knee". It is the child who learns a deep-ingrained understanding of his culture. It is the child who learns his mother tongue as part of that culture.

Conviction Ic: Language is a crucial factor in establishing a cultural identity. The coherence of a community is more likely to involve a shared language than any other feature known to me. A positive contribution of language difference is specifically that it gives coherence to a community. In addition, it can be one of the greatest incentives to resist the tyranny of a single larger community. A negative feature, on the other hand, is that it divides the world community, where it would be nice if we could all understand one another, agree with one another and not fight with one another!

Conviction Id: The early naming of things, events, people, attitudes, situations, or other items is crucial to the ability of a child to be human (not just a "shepherd dog"). A holistic view of human nature must give this characteristic very high priority. Language, involving naming, is like a cultural "telephone exchange", without which a normal human society could not exist. (An animal society has a degree of communication, although it does not go to "graduate school" to study physics.)

The meaning of something, whether it be a name, or an event, or a situation, involves the reaction of a person (or persons, or society) involved, or observing, or thinking about it.

CONVICTION II: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE CAN FOCUS TEMPORARILY ON STATIC, OR DYNAMIC, OR RELATIONAL COMPONENTS OF A SITUATION.

We start with the belief that a person does not on every occasion look at a thing in the same way. A person can choose to look on a thing as if it were isolated, unchanging, and in a "permanent" form--even when that person knows very well that the item is in fact changing or changeable. The ability to choose to change perspective is part of human nature.

Conviction IIa: A person can choose to focus on an entity as if it were a particle. If the entity is viewed as a particle, it may be seen "as if" it were for the moment "static". In that case, it could be seen as a member of a list, or as a point (somewhat isolated), or in a sequence (in a line or in time). The particle is a structural thing, and comprises a part of the identification of a larger including item which is also seen as a particle, hierarchically. A chile viewed as a whole is seen as a particle. So, also, is a football game; of a "hunch"; or dream. This view (or any other view) of these items is part of their meaning-of-the-moment for the observer.

<u>Conviction IIb: A person can choose to focus on an entity as if it were a wave</u>. The entity so viewed can be thought of as changing, as part of a sequence, or as developing to or from a nucleus, or as dynamic. The wave can be growing, or decaying, as part of a larger process involving the situation. When the child is looked at in relation to its current visible changing characteristics (getting more beautiful, for example), it is being looked at from the wave perspective. So, also, is a baseball game when·one is watching its final inning when a player is in the actual, momentary, process of making the winning run. The process feature is part of the significance, and hence of the semantic impact, on the observer.

<u>Conviction IIc: A person can choose to focus on an entity as if it were primarily a point in a larger pattern or system, i.d., as a part of--or as comprising--a field</u>. The entity so viewed can be thought of as existing in relation to the larger pattern, rather than being felt as somehow "existing autonomously" in thought or "isolatable objective reality". The field can be organized multi-dimensionally, with its parts in intersecting relations one to another simultaneously in the still-larger organized field context. The shape of the baseball diamond is not only called the "field" but is itself, semantically here, a field structure. So, also, is the planned (by the coach) constituency of the team as a whole. Holism, in linguistic semantics, requires whole elements of systems of behavior, as well as of background, and of the containing of larger systems.

<u>Conviction IId: Units, as observed by a person, include entities of various types, e.g., things, actions, attributes</u>. Each can be perceived as a particle, or a wave, or a field (or a point in a field). Things are objectively (or imaginatively) seen as physical chunks, which can in general be touched or stared at (or thought about as if they could be touched if one were close enough to do so). Actions are movements of things, in which the process of change can be observed. Attributes are characteristics of things such that the observer can mentally abstract those components, and

talk about them as if they were in fact separable entities in themselves--"fatness" can be seen as a characteristic of a weighty person; "redness" can be perceived as a certain color of a thing via the light waves being physically reflected; and "unicorn" would be an animal mythically depicted, generally, "with the body and head of a horse, the hind legs of a stag, the tail of a lion, and a single horn in the middle of the forehead" (Webster's Collegiate, 10th ed., 1993:1291).

CONVICTION III: KNOWING ABOUT A CULTURE REQUIRES ASKING QUESTIONS OF PEOPLE, LISTENING TO THEM, AND OBSERVING HOW THEY REACT VERBALLY TO DIFFERENT SITUATIONS.

We start, also, with the belief that in order to understand a culture, we must hear what people say about situations and events, either by listening to them talk to each other, or by listening carefully as to what they say in response to our questions (which must be carefully formed, to be polite in relation to that culture).

Conviction IIIa: As people talk to each other about incidents which have occurred within their community, we can learn a lot about their interpretation of the motivation for such actions, or about their moral evaluation of such actions. In some contexts, people discuss things they approve of, or of things which they condemn. Human nature is sufficiently uniform that in every culture there is approval of some ways of helping others, but disapproval of other actions, which are treated as theft or as immoral behavior.

Such discussion, or presence of some gossip, is a human universal. The anthropologist Haviland (1977) gives us a book-length discussion of such situations. For example, he maintains (p. 170) that "one can gossip only in a culture one is competent in"; and (p. 163) "Gossip trades on rules and [on] 'should' statements,...and [on] throwing out other behavior by condemning it. [Whereas] the ethnographer makes do with only the brute facts of observed regularities."

In the Mixtec language of San Miguel el Grande, Oaxaca, Mexico (where I studied the language over a period of several years), various kinds of action, when talked about in the village, can lead to a person being ostracized: e.g., refusal to vote correctly, allowing surgery on a son, which may be interpreted as responsibility for later damage; discovered theft; or adultery. These lead to treatment that I have called (Pike 1986) loss of "credit rating" in the community.

Conviction IIIb: Granted that there are absolute general universals in all languages and cultures, nevertheless each culture has its own specific cultural forms and restraints, which may be said to be emic ones, as reacted to from inside that culture, versus the etic structures as noted by outsiders (which may or may not parallel the emic ones in part). Goodman (1978:x) says that "What emerges can perhaps be described as a radical relativism under rigorous restraints". And anthropologist Goodenough (1981:108-09) uses these concepts of the etic and the emic "as crucial for cultural theory".

The terms emic and etic were introduced by Pike (1954 Section 2) to parallel culturally the terms phonemic and phonetic (and to be created by abbreviating those words). In English, for example, the difference between /p/ and /b/ makes a difference between words such as "buy" and "pie"; but in Mixtec, no such difference occurs. To be emically different, nonlinguistic emic units must also be contrastive in that culture--as baseball differs from croquet. In order to behave properly in a culture, a person must know its emic structure. (See Alvarez-Pereyre & Arom 1993:7-33 for an extensive discussion, by four authors, of the relation of emics and etics to ethnomusicology.)

CONVICTION IV: FOLKTALES NEED TO BE UNDERSTOOD WITH HELP FROM INVOLVED MEMBERS OF A COMMUNITY, IN RELATION TO THE CONTENT OF THE TALES, THEIR TIME AND

PLACE OF USE, THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY ARE TOLD, AND THE WORLD VIEW BEHIND THEM. Anthropologist Dundes stated some years ago (1968:467) that "For most of the thousands of song and folktale texts recorded in the ethnographic literature, there is either no interpretation at all or else a passing speculative comment or two provided by the collector who tells what he thinks the song or tale means." Sparing, more recently (1984:47, 27), addresses "interpersonal relationships", and "the character, life, beliefs, and world view of the community".

In relation to Mixtec folktales, I have drawn on a number of them published by Dyk (1959). But I had extensive discussion about them, both in Mixtec and in Spanish, with a local speaker (whom I will call AM, since he prefers that his name not be mentioned). I could ask about the reaction to these tales from his grandfather, his father, and twenty-six grandchildren. Here, I am using only one of the tales (with the analytical data taken from Pike 1988:392-93).

(For further kinds of components needed for a fuller description, see Conviction VIII, below.)

<u>Conviction IVa: Every emic unit needs, in its description, a mention of its class--i.e., its name or contents in relation to the larger set of other items (including phonology, grammar, and referential materials) that might be found appropriately in a comparable position in that language and culture</u>.

The name of this folktale is "The Skunks Look for a Godfather". This is one of a member of the <u>class</u> of stories about animals. Its content: The skunk couple seek a godfather to go with them to have the child baptized. They recruit a lion--but the lion refuses at the feast to eat worms. So they search for food appropriate for the lion. For that purpose, the skunk tries to kill an ox, which is lying down, by spraying on it. But the skunk gets gored and dies. All the folk cry.

Conviction IVb: Every emic unit needs in its description a mention of its slot--i.e., a particular position (or set of alternate positions) in a larger social or linguistic context in which the unit is customarily used or mentioned. The skunk tale is likely to be used by the Mixtecs at a feast, or at a lunch for workmen, where there is not enough food.

Conviction IVc: Every emic unit needs in its description a statement of its purpose, or role, or cause, explaining or constituting the function of the tale or the use of the tale. The skunk tale may be used to shame people, or to put indirect pressure on them to take better care of their neighbors. It sometimes can also be used as a joke--but it will be poorly received if there is not enough food!

Conviction IVd: Every emic unit needs in its description a statement of the broader background structure, or belief, or experience, or cultural system--its cohesion--within which the tale takes place, and which in part controls the use or the form of the tale. The skunk tale has as a background a belief system regarding baptism and the culturally appropriate relations to godfather and society. If the parents cannot provide food at the fiesta, it causes shame.

(For a much more complicated setting, with a tale told during a wake, combined with the acting out of the tale, with the audience taking a part in the action, see Howland 1981.)

CONVICTION V: PROCEDURES MAY SPROUT FROM TRUE PRINCIPLES--AND PRINCIPLES MAY GROW FROM USEFUL PROCEDURES.

Sometimes one hears of a theoretical hunch suggested by a scholar, and is able to try to apply it successfully. On the other hand, one sometimes, through trial and error, manages to get some work done without understanding just why the procedure worked; this can lead to philosophical reflection to try to arrive at principles

which would explain the "result". There may be a "cycle" between principle and procedure and principle. We must be ready to move in whichever direction seems needed--or possible--or fun!--at the moment.

Conviction Va: The procedure of starting to learn a language without an interpreter, while using gestures and pointing at things, or acting, is very workable. I have done it many times, since my first attempt for my students in 1936. Usually, within half an hour, one can get a dozen words, a few noun phrases, a few clauses, a sentence or two, and know one is "under way". (For a video sample, see my Program No. 5: "Into the Unknown", in the University of Michigan Television Center series "Pike on Language", 1977.) A statement given by the language helper during the process, after one has pointed at something, may be called an "observation sentence". The philosophers Quine and Ullian ([1970] 1978:28) affirm that it is ultimately through observation sentences "that language gets its meaning, its bearing on reality. This is why it is that they convey the basic evidence for all belief, all scientific theory". This is an instance where a somewhat "accidental" approach has proved very useful--and has received philosophical acknowledgment as to its theoretical importance. (It was accidental, in that I began to learn Mixtec in a village where I was not using an interpreter, but was learning the language directly; later I applied this in the classroom, as mentioned.)

Conviction Vb: Procedures for the growth of knowledge must start with the child; knowledge must build on experience, but the growth from experience must increase via metaphor. Knowledge must be steadily "expansive"--adding to experience. but that addition comes when the child (or grown-up "adult child") compares its experience, or knowledge, including its knowledge of the past by "heard" history, with a bit of the current unknown, and hence makes the new partly intelligible. We cannot understand the "new" directly without this help.

This makes "basic" vocabulary, with its early experience, foundational to advanced knowledge, and in

that sense as "basic" as that advanced knowledge itself. As Einstein said, in a discussion with a philosopher (1950), the word "table" is as basic as any word in physics.

This importance of childhood learning, or leaning as does a child, is as true in religion as it is in physics. For example, Jesus said (Mark 10:15, Living Bible) that "[Anyone] who refuses to come to God as a little child will never be allowed into his Kingdom".

Literature discussing the importance of metaphor is vast--I have barely begun to skim it. For example, note Brown and Witowski (1981:599, 600) who list metaphors in 25 different languages for the "human/pupil of the eye"; with eleven other languages using metaphors of seed, instead of humanness. Or note Büky (1984:784-85) with metaphors treated semiotically, with lists of different concept categories where a first concept is compared to a second.

Conviction Vc: Language uses metaphor as a tool to build abstract concepts and world view. Babies perceive, touch, hear, with innate capacities to learn to recognize things and movements. But to move from "a stumble" to a more abstract treatment of a failure as generalized to the broader situation in some business requires metaphorical capacity. Tyler said (1978:50) that "Our new visions of the world are metaphoric; we bring into contact concepts that were hitherto remote and unconnected; we predict new things of old concepts". An extensive discussion of metaphors and concepts we "live by" is seen in Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

Conviction Vd: Poetry utilizes metaphorical development to let the reader connect things or views which may be of potential interest to him, but which may not have been thought of as related in that way. Riming word pairs may force such a connection. Suppose I try it, here, using "pain/gain" to suggest an unexpected value from the hurt; and using "grow/sow" to force parallelism between the relation of trees to seed and of thoughts to their development out of pain:

My foot is in pain
But that is gain
If thought may grow
From seed which pain can sow.

And somewhere--I have lost the reference--the American poet Frost suggested that metaphors (or the like) are a ladder by which we climb to the sky. (For the detailed hierarchical tamemic phonological analysis of a poem, including its voice quality, see Pike and Pike 1983, Chapter 2.)

CONVICTION VI: THE THREE HIERARCHIES OF PHONOLOGY, GRAMMAR, AND REFERENCE INTERLOCK AND ALLOW FOR EXPERIMENTAL VARIATION WITHIN THE EMIC LOCAL STRUCTURE OF THEIR LEVELS.

One expects to find, in any language, three kinds of language structure in which parts make up wholes with differing levels of increasingly larger structures.

The phonological hierarchy has emic relevant sounds (phonemes) in its system, which are included in a larger unit, a kind of emic syllable (with consonants and vowels); which are included in some kind of rhythm unit containing one of more syllables that, in turn, enters still larger phonological units up to a special phonological kind of text (e.g., as a limerick, in English, may have a particular phonological pattern of rhythm and rime). (For the levels of rhythm in a phonological hierarchy treated as a "metrical constitutent structure" see linguist Everett 1988.)

The grammatical hierarchy is the structure from morpheme to word to phrase to clause to sentence to paragraph and to text or conversation. (And the limerick, in turn, may have typical grammatical characteristics, beginning, for example, with "There was an old [person] from [place])". The grammatical order is the order of "telling".

The referential order, on the contrary, is the order of "happening". And the referential material is structured in numerous simultaneous hierarchies of social or personal or language data--e.g., kinship systems, social systems, personal appearance and personal form, and chronological history of happenings. (For a sample analysis of the referential versus the grammatical structure of a text, in tagmemic structural holistic terms, see Evelyn G. Pike 1992.)

Conviction VIa: Although the three hierarchies are structurally different in their function, they are simultaneously present in speech or action, and may share some of the forms in an overlapping manner. That is, the physical material may simultaneously belong to more than one of the hierarchies--either with beginnings and endings in some instances the same, or with the divisions between their respective units coming at different points in the spoken or acted sequence.

Humor often exploits this fact with puns in which two words may share the same pronunciation but different lexical (referential) meanings. For example, a fisherman is said to have read a sign at the river as "Don't fish hear?", although, in fact, the sign was "Don't fish here!" So, the fisherman said to himself "I don't know", and he went on fishing. (See Pike 1981:32-37 for a more detailed discussion of this pun.)

Conviction VIb: By experimental syntax one can artificially re-tell a story in a different order, changing the telling order (the grammatical form) but preserving unchanged the happening being discussed (the referential structure). This allows a change of focus, through grammatical change, without changing the (referential) event as such. For a simple instance, note the following story (taken from Pike 1983): "(a) John came home. (b) He ate supper. (c) He went to the movies." By shifting the order to (c)(b)(a) one gets: "(c) John went to the movies. (b) But before that he had eaten his supper, (a) after coming home." This shifts the focus to the movie event. In scores of

languages of Papua New Guinea, however, one cannot change the order in this way--and no word for "after" is available! Nonetheless, focus can be changed by using a different technique--by saying "Coming home, and eating supper, John went to the movie." (For a more extensive discussion of a different re-telling of a story with three participants involved see Pike 1981: 47-63. For some twenty further samples and discussions of experimental syntax in various languages and in a variety of circumstances, with material which might also be useful for language learning and teaching, see Pike 1993b.)

Conviction VIc: Paraphrase is a form of alternative grammatical (and phonological) expression of the same referential material. Paraphrase is intended to preserve or summarize the meaning as intended by the original speaker, and as acceptable to him/her, yet to put that meaning in a form which differs from, or changes, the focus or emphasis, in order to meet the summarizing needs of the listener. A student, for example, may be told by a teacher to "tell me in your own words what I have said"--and may do so by paraphrase acceptable to both. (An exact quotation would not suit an American teacher who would feel that the student had not understood the information if he/she could not rephrase it.)

Conviction VId: From this perspective, translation is one kind of paraphrase, in the sense that the grammatical form of the second language may require a different order. Some lexical referential material may also need to be added or substituted, because of the different knowledge and lexical structure of speakers of the second language. Metaphors, also, may be quite different from language to language, and affect translation acceptability. Since translation relates language to language via structure and meaning, translation is one kind of linguistics.

Conviction VIe: Whether in paraphrase, or in translation, or in general language learning, or in the ordinary social use of a language, both form and meaning are necessary for adequate results. An attempt to express

meaning without using language (or some other symbolic means, such as gesture) is pointless. So, also, an assumption that one can use language socially with no attempt either to imply or to interpret meaning or purpose or intention must fail to lead to normal communication.

A holistic view of semantics in a linguistic context requires a holistic view of language structure, including relation of units to class, slot, role, and cohesion (see Section IVa-d), and relation to hierarchies of phonology, grammar, and reference. An approach to sign systems, which in semantic areas is somewhat holistic also, is semiotics, about which there is a large literature. As an interesting application of semiotics to the theatre and drama, see Elam 1980. For an excellent summary of semiotic development, see Sebeok 1991.

CONVICTION VII: PERSON HAS PRIORITY OVER LOGIC IN DETERMINING THE EMIC VALIDITY OF SOCIAL PATTERNS.

Conviction VIIa: Personal judgement must precede valid logical decision. The philosopher Angus Sinclair taught me years ago (1951), in personal discussion, that no truly basic premise can be proved. In the syllogism "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal", the conclusion is logically valid. For it to be known to be true, however, the premises such as "All men are mortal" must also be true. But to prove, logically, that these are true, further syllogisms are necessary--and they also may be valid but not "proved" in themselves. Eventually, Sinclair pointed out, one gets so far back in the discussion that one does not know how to get the premises any further back. Then one must resort to lower-level discussion utilizing a kind of metaphorical approach: "It is somewhat like this-- but not totally"; etc. If this is true, it follows that we, as persons, must first start with unproved beliefs before we can develop logically. (Note, in Sections Ib and Va, reference to the child as a starting point. Compare, also, philosopher Pepper--[1942] 1970:94--who shows that "a world theory"

begins with a "root metaphor fresh from vital common sense". And, [p. 112], "If a man is to be creative in the construction of a new world theory he must dig among the crevices of common sense".)

Conviction VIIb: We need a belief system we can "live by", not merely argue by. For this, we need to start with a holistic view, growing from the unproved starting understanding of a child and building by metaphor to an adult abstract but applicable set of convictions. For this to be workable across cultures, however, there must be universals present that, in spite of variation within them, include moral components which can often be recognized across cultures. (See Pike 1972 for the relevance of this to debate with persons in disagreement.)

Conviction VIIc: Every culture grants that some things are "bad"; but the bad is always the deterioration of the good; it is never really original (Pike 1993a:63-76). Across cultures one expects to find objection to taking items felt to belong to someone else, or to sexual mis-conduct locally defined, or to the misrepresentation of truth, or to the mistreatment of persons in one's friendship circle. I have been surprised to find how quickly persons in a foreign culture may recognize kindness in a visitor, even if his habits are very different or even, temporarily, unintelli-gible to them.

Courts of law must rely on some such underlying feeling in the local culture. A jury is expected to react radically differently to an action which is obviously an intended murder (e.g., by using an automobile for that purpose) versus an action which is accidental and unintend-ed. The personal relation is at stake here (and, in tagmemic terms, note especially the role cell, cf. Section IVc, above).

CONVICTION VIII: MEANING IS NOT MADE UP OF SHARPLY SEPARATED BITS, BUT OF OVERLAPPING COMPONENTS, AS IN AN IRREGULAR "VENN DIAGRAM".

Conviction VIIIa: Variation is normal for the meaning of a word when it occurs in different contexts. The word "run" is different in meaning in the sentence "He ran home" versus "He ran the business". The wave component leaves room for this concept (cf. Conviction IIb).

Conviction VIIIb: Different contexts may contribute different meanings to (or force the selection among meanings of) a word or statement. The grammatical position of object, for the phrase "the business" in the preceding paragraph, plus the implicit referential context of a business structure, combine with the meaning of "activity in a direction" in that sentence to give the actual meaning, there, of "run". Compare the statement of the phenomenologist Ricoeur (1978:142) that we point "to the semantic event as to the point of intersection between several semantic lines; this construction is the means by which all the words taken together make sense". (The way a verb paradigm may have irregular overlapping phonological bits in rows and columns, and yet have the meaning unambiguous when the intersection of the rows and columns is looked at as a whole, can be seen in the Fore of Papua New Guinea [Pike 1963]. The technique has then been elaborated in Pike and Simons [1993] to show how these irregular formations can be used for reconstructing a language family when the smaller phonological bits may not be as readily visible.)

Conviction VIIIc: Complexity of structure is sometimes easier to understand than is apparent simplicity of form. It might be easier to understand the function of a head as a whole, than it is of a pimple on the face. The logician Langer said [1973:185, 2nd ed.], in an introduction to symbolic logic: "If we chance upon a fairly complex and even surprising proposition, from which very many simple ones would follow, we are perfectly justified in taking the former as a postulate and deriving the others from it". It is precisely this position that I have been taking here in affirming the value of dealing with holistic semantics in holistic contexts.

SUMMARY: Meaning in its more complex forms, involves the interaction of academic modules of phonology with referent lexicon in purpose or rimes. It also involves interaction of sound and grammars--or grammar and referential cognitive material.

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KEN PIKE'S THANKS

Thanks to Udom and Hopple
The mouse and the cat.

All's well that ends well.
   [=tone glides?] (well well!)

Edmondson: "I'm able to cut off
   the heads of the speakers."
      [=ends the conference?]

Tones leave bones from heads
   in history's graves,
But no groans are heard
   since tongues got lost
      when heads got tossed--
         although "tongues" remain
            in social domain.

In this report finalizing, finally.
   I must try, not lie, re-Thai-
      although I'm not the Rector
   to "rectify" (Rector's task).
      (or rector-ify) the data.

From Bauer: "We can believe it or not"
   when showered with words.
So just relax--
   there is no tax to pay today--

So fax the facts to friends
   from brain on left
      to brain on right--

We say "Bye bye"
   in tune and tone.