

THE MEANING OF THE AUXILIARY MORPHEME 'DUG IN THE ASPECT SYSTEMS OF SOME CENTRAL TIBETAN DIALECTS

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1. INTRODUCTION¹

The topic of this paper is a historical-comparative investigation of the meaning of the auxiliary morpheme *'dug* in some Central Tibetan dialects. The interesting point about this morpheme is that it is used in apparently opposite meanings in the imperfective and perfective aspects. In the imperfective aspect, *'dug* is used in many dialects for, roughly speaking, a “plus evidential” (+EVID) meaning, in order to express that the communicated information is based on the speaker's own experience or eyewitnessing. In the perfective aspect, on the other hand, *'dug* appears in some dialects with a “minus evidential” (-EVID) meaning. In at least one case, namely Lhomi, these opposite meanings are even to be found within the same dialect.

In order to explain this surprising situation, we shall discuss in some detail the relevant parts² of the auxiliary morpheme systems of those dialects for which a -EVID meaning of *'dug* in the perfective aspect has been described. These are Kagate (Höhlig 1978), Southern Mustang (Kretschmar 1995), Lhomi (Vesalainen/Vesalainen 1980) and Jirel (Maibaum/Strahm 1973, Strahm 1975). Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973, Schöttelndreyer 1975, 1978, Woodbury 1986) will also be included for comparison, since Sherpa *-nok*, which is etymologically unclear, behaves in a manner exactly comparable to *'dug* in the other dialects.

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² “Relevant parts” are those morphemes which directly belong to the evidentiality phenomenon in question, i.e. *'dug* in all its uses as well as its respective immediate constituents. This definition excludes, among other things, discussion of special morphemes used for first person actor in declaratives (and often for second person actor in questions), as well as the related phenomenon of a “conjunct/disjunct” opposition in embedded speech (as defined by Hale).

The exact features that make up the evidentiality system seem to vary for each dialect and will be described in more detail in section 2 below. The following table shows the -EVID position of 'dug and -nok in the perfective auxiliary morpheme systems of the dialects mentioned:

	+EVID	-EVID
Kagate	-si: witnessed	-tu/-du: unwitnessed
<i>Southern Mustang</i>	-sur/-so: direct observation, certain knowledge	-tuk/-ruk: no certain knowledge, assumption, conjecture
<i>Lhomi</i>	-sor: "simple past disjunct"	-tuk: "stative past disjunct" -pa pət: "remote past"
<i>Jirel</i>	-sur: certainty, visibility, proximity	-duk: uncertainty, invisibility, non-proximity
<i>Sherpa</i>	-sur: proximity, certainty, visibility	-nok: non-proximity, uncertainty, non-visibility

Table 1. Morphemes used for the evidentiality opposition in the perfective aspect

The +EVID morphemes are cognates of Written Tibetan (WT) *song* in Southern Mustang, Lhomi, Jirel and Sherpa, and of *zin* in Kagate. In Lhomi a third morpheme -pa pət is involved in the evidentiality opposition; see the description below (section 2.3). In Southern Mustang, there are two additional morphemes, labelled "preterite" and "durative preterite", which seem to have some reference to evidentiality, but since, unlike in Lhomi, they do not directly interfere with the opposition between -sur and -tuk, they have been omitted from the table and will be discussed only later (see sections 2.2. and 3.2.2.).

The key to the apparently contradictory uses of 'dug in the perfective vs. the imperfective aspects lies perhaps in an inferential meaning of 'dug in the perfective aspect at an earlier stage of the language.³ But before explaining this idea more precisely, we need to look at how the functioning of 'dug, and its equivalent -nok, is described for the individual dialects.

³ No investigation about the historical development of -nok can be made due to its unclear etymology. However, cf. section 3.1. for discussion of its evidential meaning.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PHENOMENON IN THE INDIVIDUAL DIALECTS

2.1. Kagate

For Kagate, Höhlig 1978 describes a set of three morphemes *-si*, *-tu* (appearing as *-du* after nasals, laterals, and long vowels) and *lo*, all belonging to the “completive aspect”, which according to her is “a simple indefinite past which indicates that an event has been accomplished” (p. 20). These morphemes give information about the speaker's relation to the story he is telling. The use of the morpheme *-si* means that the speaker was an eyewitness to the information he is giving. With the first person, this form is obligatory, “for obvious reasons, since first person use implies that one is an eyewitness” (p. 20),⁴ but *-si* is possible also with second and third person. If the speaker is not an eyewitness, he can use either *-tu*, which means that he has not seen the event himself,⁵ or he can be more precise as to his source of information by using *-si lo* (if his information comes from an eyewitness) or *-tu lo* (if his source of information is not an eyewitness). *lo* is a particle indicating “secondhand information”, which is also found in other dialects. *-tu* is also used when the speaker has figured out the information by deduction (see n. 5); this corresponds to the inferential meaning, which interests us in this paper. The use of *-si* and *-tu* in Kagate is further illustrated by the way one speaker combined these morphemes when describing a fire. The speaker had come to the burning house, and in his report he used *-tu* for those events which had happened before his arrival, e.g. the origin of the fire, and *-si* for the stages he had observed himself.

As for the imperfective aspect, no systematic information about its auxiliary system can be drawn from Höhlig's paper, because her topic is not a complete description of the Kagate aspect system. It is, however, possible that 'dug exists in the imperfective, too, since Höhlig (p. 21, n. 4) indicates that there are other

⁴ This statement certainly corresponds to what one would expect, and it is apparently confirmed by the Kagate usage of the evidential morphemes. However, it is not valid as a general principle, since in Shigatse, e.g., the occurrence of “evidential” forms, implying direct perception by the speaker, is not strictly obligatory with the first person; cf. the examples (14) and (15) in Felix Haller's contribution to this volume.

⁵ There is some confusion in the description of the function of *-tu*, but on the whole it becomes clear that *-tu* must have the meaning given above. Cf. Höhlig 1978:21: “*-tu* states that the speaker got his information from someone other than an eyewitness, or that he figured it out by deduction.” This phrasing seems to exclude the use of *-tu* in the case of information received from an eyewitness. But when illustrating the use of *-si*, *-tu* and *lo* by describing how the report of a certain event is passed on from the eyewitness A to another person B, and thence from B to C, and from C to D, Höhlig comments: “B has the choice between *-si lo* and *-tu*, since both forms indicate that B was not the eyewitness himself” (23). From the fact that B can use *-tu*, it follows that *-tu* does not necessarily imply a source “other than an eyewitness”. *-tu* therefore only means that the speaker himself has not seen the event.

forms with which *-tu* should not be confused. These forms are *-kudu* (*-gudu* after nasals and laterals, *-wdu* after long vowels), which expresses the meaning “incomplete progressive, non-habitual stative”, and *du*, which means “nonhabitual stative”. The latter is also used as an existential verb. But even if these forms descend from Written Tibetan *’dug*, we don’t know anything about their possible implications as to evidentiality.

2.2. Southern Mustang

For Southern Mustang the phenomenon dealt with here is described by Kretschmar 1995/1:155ff. in terms of the opposition of an observed perfect (“beobachtetes Perfekt”) indicating direct observation or certain knowledge on the part of the speaker, marked with the auxiliary verb *-sūŋ* or *-so*, versus a perfect of assumption (“Perfekt der Annahme”) with *-tuk* (appearing as *-ruk* after verbs ending in a vowel), meaning that the speaker’s knowledge is not certain, but rather that the description of the event is based on an assumption or conjecture. The opposition between the observed perfect and the perfect of assumption has been explained and illustrated by some sentence pairs by Kretschmar’s informants; according to her it is not always easy to see the difference in the material. Kretschmar does not mention an inferential use of the “Perfekt der Annahme”, but most of the examples could be understood in this way, as e.g. the following sentences:⁶

- (1) *sompā* *tōr-tūk*
 Tibetan.boot.ABS lose-PF.ASS
 ‘(My) shoe has/had been lost.’ (assumption)
- as compared to
- (2) *sompā* *tōr-sūŋ*
 Tibetan.boot.ABS lose-PF.OBS
 ‘I have /had lost (my) shoe.’ (observation/statement)⁷

The “assumption” of having lost one’s shoe is very probably an inference from perceiving that the shoe is not there anymore.

⁶ In all examples throughout this paper, the phonological representation of the Tibetan sentences is my interpretation of an original transcription (very similar in the case of Southern Mustang, rather different in Jirel and Sherpa). The glosses for the Southern Mustang sentences are mine (based on Kretschmar’s respective entries in her dictionary, vol. 4 of Kretschmar 1995); in Jirel and Sherpa, the original glosses have as a rule been used. The translations for Southern Mustang are my translations of the German originals; in Jirel and Sherpa the original translations are given if not otherwise indicated.

⁷ In most of the sentence pairs, the opposite of “assumption” (“Annahme”) is “observation” (“Beobachtung”) alone, but in two cases, “statement” (“Feststellung”) is added, viz. in those sentences where the speaker’s statement concerns himself.

Similarly, with the following sentence, quoted from one of the stories:

- (3) *“tā ʃī lək-tūk”, nē-rī-rāŋ*
 now fall.asleep-PF.ASS say-CONV-CONV
 “Now she has fallen asleep”, he said.’

The assumption that “she” (the speaker's wife) has fallen asleep is, in itself, likely to be an inference from what the speaker is perceiving (e.g. closed eyes, a special way of breathing etc.), but in this case the inferential meaning can even be definitely confirmed from the context: the woman pretends to be asleep when her husband comes home, and he is checking whether she is really sleeping by pressing down her feet. Since she wants him to think that she is asleep, she does not utter any sound, and this absence of reaction on her part is the basis for his inference that she must have fallen asleep.

The meaning of the “perfect”, to which the forms dealt with above belong, is that an event was completed in the past, but its effect extends in the speaker's view into the present time. Besides this “perfect”, Kretschmar (1995/1:153ff) describes a “preterite” and a “durative preterite”. The “preterite”, consisting of the “perfect participle” plus *rak* or *nak* (the two morphemes are distributed geographically, see Kretschmar 1995/1:108), is the simple narrative form of the past. The “durative preterite”, consisting of the “present participle II” or the bare past stem and the auxiliary morphemes *ø*, *øta rak* or *øta nak*, corresponds in meaning to the English progressive form ‘was doing’. In the function of a “durative preterite”, this formation is used only with second and third persons, while with first persons, it is understood as a simple or durative present (cf. Kretschmar 1995/1:154). About both “preterite” formations more will be said in the last part of this paper (cf. section 3.2.2.).

The “secondhand information particle” *lo*, which was described above for Kagate, also exists in Southern Mustang (as *-lo* or *-no*), but does not seem to be integrated to the same degree into the evidentiality system. According to Kretschmar 1995/1:158ff., it indicates that the content of the speaker's statement is represented as a generally known fact. *-lo* or *-no* is used with finite verbal forms of the present/future as well as of the past. It seems that in most cases the use of *-lo* or *-no* is a consciously employed stylistic device. Some narrators, however, have *-lo* or *-no* as their usual form for reporting. In Kretschmar's examples of the use of this morpheme in a past tense context, *-lo* is combined with *-rak*.

As for the imperfective aspect, there is apparently no 'dug used in these formations in Southern Mustang.

2.3. Lhomi

The description of Lhomi by Vesalainen/Vesalainen 1980:69ff. is more complex than those of the other dialects discussed, since in both past and non-past⁸ two “tenses” are described. Within the past, there is the “simple past tense” on the one hand and the “remote past tense” on the other. The difference between the two is not really a matter of tense but of evidentiality: in the “simple past”, which “describes a terminated event” (p. 70) and is formed with the auxiliary *-soŋ*, the speaker must be an eyewitness, that is, he must actually have seen the events taking place. The “remote past”, on the other hand, “is used for events that took place in the remote past and about which the relator has normally an eyewitness report” (p. 71). However, the former of these features does not seem to be specific for this tense, since the authors state (p. 70) that the “simple past” can also be used for events that took place in the remote past. Therefore, the crucial distinction between “simple past” and “remote past” seems to be the difference in evidentiality, i.e. “one’s own eyewitnessing” vs. “report from an eyewitness”. The remote past may also be used in historical narratives, when “the relator firmly believes that the events of the story have taken place and are true” (p. 71). The remote past is formed by adding *-pa peṭ* to the past stem of the verb. *-pa peṭ* consists of the “non-finite suffix” *-pa*, which is cognate to the WT “nominalizer” *pa/ba*, and the auxiliary morpheme *peṭ*, which corresponds etymologically to WT *byed*.

“Any event the speaker has not been an eyewitness of, or given a direct report on” (p. 85), may be marked by the secondhand particle *lɔ*, which absolves the speaker from being responsible for the truth of the statement. *lɔ* may be combined with *-soŋ* as well as with *-pa peṭ* (cf. the examples of Vesalainen/Vesalainen 1980:85; the difference between *-soŋ lɔ* and *-pa peṭ lɔ* is not explained). If however, in a historical narrative, the speaker uses *-tuk*, then *-tuk* has the same function as *lɔ*, and the speaker does not need an additional *lɔ*. Beside this function in historical narratives, *-tuk* is also clearly described as inferential: “The speaker has seen the results of the event but not the event” (p. 100, n. 4).

One of the special features which this Lhomi system shows is the distinction of two forms in historical narratives, both expressing non-eyewitnessing, depending on whether the speaker firmly believes that the events are true (*-pa peṭ*) or prefers to take no responsibility for their truth (*-tuk*). Both morphemes are also used outside historical narratives: *-pa peṭ* for information received from

⁸ The terms “past” and “non-past” are used by the Vesalainen/Vesalainen for the stems with which the tenses are formed. Since in Tibetan verbal stems express aspect, this corresponds to my “perfective” and “imperfective”. The tenses themselves are called “stative tenses” in the “non-past” category. For this term, see n. 9 below.

an eyewitness, *-tuk* for an inference made by the speaker. Considering the fact that an inference made by the speaker implies his own perception of the results of the event, the narrative use of *-tuk* seems at first sight surprising, since it there expresses the more reserved attitude of the speaker, i.e. his wish to take no responsibility for the truth of the narrative. We will come back to this problem below (cf. section 3.2.2.).

For the non-past, Vesalainen/Vesalainen (1980:71ff.) describe a "present tense" and a "non-past tense". The "present tense" covers present, immediate future or, depending on the context, recent iterative; the "non-past tense" covers present, immediate and distant future. The "present tense" is marked by *-kət* in the conjunct, by *-kuk* in the disjunct form; this may be interpreted with some probability as *gi yod* and *gi 'dug* respectively. For the disjunct form, i.e. the form containing 'dug, the requirement of eyewitnessing is explicitly stated. Thus, this is a case where the opposition between a +EVID meaning of 'dug with imperfective and a -EVID meaning with perfective aspect is clearly attested within the same dialect. For the "non-past tense" no functional definition is given, apart from the range of time mentioned above. The morphemes for the "non-past tense" are *-ken* for the conjunct and *-ken pət* for the disjunct form.

2.4. Jirel

According to Strahm (1975:120), the morphemes *-surj* and *-duk* in Jirel both belong to the "past tense";⁹ *-surj* indicates "certainty, visibility, and proximity" and *-duk* indicates "uncertainty, invisibility, and non-proximity". I have tried to find out more about the precise meaning of these labels by reading two texts discussed below. The rules governing the use of *-surj* and *-duk* in Jirel have not become fully clear to me, but most of the usages seem compatible with the assumption of some kind of evidentiality pattern.

The two texts I looked at are a report concerning the economic development of Jiri (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:283-289) and a story about a white and a black cat, a kind of fable or traditional story (*ibid.*, pp. 244-252). In the report about the economic development of Jiri, we have not a single *-duk*, but many instances

⁹ In Jirel, the term "past" is used as a label for the tense of the "event category", and "non-past" for the tense of the "state category". This terminology corresponds to the SIL description system for clause patterns, in which the most important classification is that into "event patterns" and "state patterns". The "event category" covers the chain of actual happenings in the narrative discourse, the "state category" covers all other information (i.e. information concerning participants, setting and background, collateral information, performatives) and includes modals, negatives, and non-indicative moods (cf. Strahm 1975:74). This distinction does not conform to the opposition between imperfective and perfective aspect used in this paper. However, it is explicitly stated that "the past tense describes a terminated event" (Strahm 1975:120). Therefore, the Jirel "past tense" may be considered a "perfective" category.

of *-sun*. This fits very well with the fact that the speaker is reporting events that he has seen himself and in which he is also partly involved as a participant. Cf. the following sentence (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:284, sentence 8, my translation):

- (4) *thērū-i tī:ri ānekou murra me:ḡā thēn-sun*
 there-after later different.kinds.N Murra buffalo take.to-PDJ
 'Later, various kinds of Murra buffaloes were brought (to Jiri).'

In the cat story, the most frequent finite verbal construction is *-duklo*. Cf. the following sentence (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:247, sentence 24):

- (5) *theme ḡel jī kḥūr-gīn wā-duk-lo*
 then bread.N two carry-CONS come-PDJ-RI
 '(The black cat) came back carrying two pieces of bread.'

According to Strahm (1975:132) the secondhand particle *-lo*, which is again involved here, is used whenever the speaker has not been an eyewitness or has not been given a direct report; it absolves the speaker from being responsible for the truth of the statement. In other dialects, as we have seen, *-lo* can be freely combined with the respective evidential auxiliaries (see sections 2.1. and 2.3. for Kagate and Lhomi, and 2.5. for Sherpa). In Southern Mustang (2.2.), the occurrences quoted by Kretschmar were combined with *-rak*, therefore it is not clear whether *-sunlo* and *-duklo* exist in this dialect). In Jirel, however, it seems that mainly *-duk* occurs in this combination.¹⁰ This use would fit well with the meaning of *-duk* as we have seen it in the other dialects, since there, too, *-duk* stands for non-eyewitnessing. However, in Jirel, this meaning of *-duk* seems to be restricted to its combination with *-lo*, since *-duk* alone can be used for reporting directly perceived events. The semantic implications of *-duk* in this usage have not yet become fully clear to me. The sentences in which *-duk* occurs without *-lo* in the cat story will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

- (6) "kārmu-te ḡal-sin nākpo-te wōḡ-go" sī-duk
 white-F go-COND black-F come-FUT say-PDJ
 'They had said, "If the white one has gone, the black one will come.'"

The speaker of this sentence (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:246) is the white cat. Because of having stolen some food, he has been expelled by his master. On his way, he meets the black cat and is now telling him what his master said when expelling him. As this scene was described earlier in the story, we know for

¹⁰ One example sentence for *-lo* in Strahm (1975:132) is constructed with *-sun*, but in the cat story only *-duklo* occurs, as is the case with three further stories in the collection (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:183-201) which I have also checked in this connection.

certain that the cat has heard these words himself. This case could possibly be explained by the conjecture that *sīduk* is a kind of quotation marking formula.¹¹ But for the next sentence, immediately following example (6) in the text of the cat story, there is no such possibility (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:246; my translation):

- (7) *kʰō wā-duk*
 you come-PDJ
 '(And) you have (indeed) come.' (or: 'are coming'? see below)

As in example (6), the speaker is the white cat talking to the black one somewhere on the way. The same form reoccurs when the white cat's master states that the black cat has arrived (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:247; my translation):

- (8) *nakpo-te wā-duk*
 black-F come-PDJ
 'A black one has come.' (or: 'comes'? see below)

In both examples (7) and (8), the use of *-duk* cannot be explained in terms of the "non-eyewitnessing" function that we found for the morpheme in other dialects and in Jirel *-duklo*, since both speakers can see the black cat when they utter their sentences: the white cat in example (7) can see the other cat being on his way, and the master in example (8) can see that the black cat has arrived. There is a possible explanation, which however depends on how the use of the Jirel past stem *wā-* in example (7) is to be understood. If this past stem meant 'you have come', i.e. if it expressed that the coming had been completed at the time of speaking, then the use of the past stem would be as surprising (because the cat is still on his way) as the use of *-duk* is, because of the white cat's eyewitnessing of the process (see above). In this case, the explanation could be that the speaking cat, in uttering this sentence, anticipates the moment when the black cat will actually arrive at his destination. The reason for such an anticipation could be that the white cat is stating that his master's prediction, quoted by him in example (6), is going to come true. This would explain why the white cat uses exactly the same form as the master himself in example (8). The explanation for the use of *-duk* in example (8), and therefore by anticipation also in example (7), would then be that the speaker's statement is based on his direct perception of the

¹¹ Cf. examples (14) to (16) below for Sherpa *sīnōk*. In this case, it is moreover possible that the quoted sentence is no original statement of the cat's master, but something like a (Nepali?) proverb. The basis for this conjecture is that in sentence 22, where the statement reoccurs, the master utters the whole sentence in Nepali, and then repeats its content in Jirel.

results of the event (i.e. on his seeing the cat near his house). We will see in section 3.1. that “direct perception of the results of an event” is probably the original evidential meaning of *'dug* with perfective aspect, at a stage even preceding the inferential use.

However, as Balthasar Bickel kindly informs me, there are many South Asian languages, e.g. Nepali and Kiranti languages, in which verbs like ‘to come’ encode the inception rather than the process of motion, and therefore past perfective (or at least, non-imperfective) forms mean something like ‘has started to come, is on its way’. Since to my knowledge this observation is not valid for Tibetan, the occurrence of the phenomenon in Jirel would have to be explained as an influence from Nepali, which is of course far from impossible, given that great parts of the Jirel vocabulary are influenced by Nepali. On this assumption the past form *wā-*, meaning ‘(you) are on your way’, would be appropriate in example (7), but *-duk* would then remain unexplained. Moreover, in example (8), where the same form reoccurs, the meaning ‘is on his way’ strictly speaking does not fit, since the black cat has already arrived when this sentence is spoken. However, it is perhaps alternatively possible to conceive of the cat as just arriving, i.e. still being in motion, as the translation of example (8) by Maibaum/Strahm seems to suggest: ‘A black one comes’. (It is not clear to what extent the translation of Maibaum/Strahm may be influenced by the Nepali situation.)

We have now discussed two possible solutions for the problem of the meaning of *wā-* in examples (7) and (8): either the past means that the coming has been completed at the time of speaking, so that it is appropriate in example (8) and anticipated in example (7). Or else the verb ‘to come’ encodes the inception of motion in Jirel, so that the past means ‘has started to come, is on its way’ and is appropriate in example (7), but perhaps less so in example (8). The first of these solutions would at the same time solve the problem of the use of *'dug*, which in the second case remains unclear in both sentences. However, a final decision about the problem cannot be arrived at within the framework of this paper. (*wāduklo* in example (5) expresses an event which is part of the chain of events in the story. Therefore, it must indicate an event that is past at the time of speaking, i.e. in this case it cannot mean ‘is on his way’ (cf. the translation of Maibaum/Strahm: ‘came back’). However, this example is not strictly comparable to (7) and (8), because in example (5) we have *-duklo* instead of *-duk*, and it is not clear to what extent the use of the typical narrative form with *-lo* might alter the interpretation of *wā-*).

The last instance of *-duk* without *-lo* in this story is the following sentence (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:250):

- (9) *dɛ-pa-ka* *dzɔda* *gal-duk*
 here-LOC-EMPH big become-PDJ
 'This one is bigger.'

This is what the cats say when watching a monkey weighing two pieces of bread. The two cats wanted to share the bread and the monkey has offered to act as a judge in order to ensure that both of them get pieces of the same size. However, his real intent is to eat the whole bread by himself. Thus, when the cats protest that one piece is bigger than the other, he breaks a portion off the bigger piece and eats it. As a result, this piece is now smaller. He again weighs the two pieces, eats a portion of the bigger one, and so on. In this sequence of the story, "this one is bigger" occurs several times. With respect to the of *-surj* and *-duk*, it is an especially puzzling sequence, since exactly the same statement in the same context is one time made with *-duk* (see above), and another time with *-surj* (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:250):

- (10) *dɛ-pa-ka* *dzɔda* *wɔŋ-surj*
 here-LOC-EMPH big become-PDJ
 'This one is bigger.'

The same phrasing reoccurs, without *depaka*, in sentence 43. In this case, I have no explanation for the distribution of *-surj* and *-duk*. In general, however, the uses of *-surj* in the cat story agree with what was said above for the report about the economic development of Jiri: the speaker is always directly perceiving,¹² often personally involved in the event reported. Consider, e.g., the following sentence (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:246; my translation):

- (11) *thɛme* *juk* *sɛ-n* *tɛn-gɛn* *tāŋ-surj*
 then go.IMP say-CONS get.out-CONS send.away-PDJ
 'Then they drove me out and sent me away, saying: "Go!"'

Another example is the last sentence of the story (Maibaum/Strahm 1973:250, sentence 45 [erroneously marked as a second 43]; my translation):

- (12) *thə* *sɛn-surj*
 now finish-PDJ
 'Now (the story) is finished.'

¹² In one case, namely *mə-jāŋ-surj* (NEG-suffice-PDJ) 'That is not all right' (sentence 28), the stated fact is not sensorily perceived. However, the above label "direct perception" is applicable in the sense that the statement is neither based on someone else's report nor on an inference.

Within the Jirel “non-past tense”, the auxiliary morpheme *-duk* occurs only in *-kiduk*, which is described as an aspect marker expressing “habitual aspect, disjunct” (Strahm 1975:123ff.).¹³ If there is any implication as to evidentiality in this form, this does not emerge from the description. However, it is perhaps a plausible assumption that Jirel *-kiduk* could be used for directly perceived events, since Lhomi *-kuk*, which is very probably etymologically the same as *-kiduk*, is clearly described as a morpheme for eyewitnessing (cf. section 2.3. above), and etymologically corresponding morphemes in SST and Shigatse also have the same function (cf. section 3.2.1. below).

2.5. Sherpa

The description given by Schöttelndreyer (1975:48) for *-suŋ* and *-nok* in Sherpa is nearly identical with that quoted above for the analogous Jirel morphemes. Both morphemes are used in the disjunctive form of the “eventive past tense”;¹⁴ *-suŋ* contains the meaning of “proximity, certainty, and visibility”, *-nok* contains the meaning of “non-proximity, uncertainty, and non-visibility”. A more precise understanding of what these labels mean can be gathered from the use of *-suŋ* and *-nok* in the different kinds of Sherpa narratives, which Schöttelndreyer 1978, especially 261ff., describes as follows:

fables, remote narratives	event-oriented		<i>-nok</i>
	participant-oriented		<i>-nok</i>
reports	plot-oriented	direct	<i>-suŋ</i>
		indirect	<i>-nok lwə</i>
	narrator-oriented	direct	<i>-yin ~ -in</i>
		indirect	<i>-up dza</i>

Table 2. Narrative types in Sherpa and the morphemes for the marking of the event sequence, after Schöttelndreyer 1978

¹³ There is also one aspect marker with *-duk* belonging to the past tense, namely *-kin dəttūk* (besides *-kin dətsūŋ*) for “past unrelentive”. But this aspect marker does not add anything to our knowledge about the functioning of *-suŋ* and *-duk*, as the “unrelentive” meaning obviously lies in *dət-*, which is a cognate of WT *sdod*, *bsdad* and means ‘to sit, to stay, to remain’.

¹⁴ The terms “eventive past tense” and “non-eventive tenses” in Sherpa refer to the distinction between “event patterns” and “state patterns” used by the SIL researchers (cf. n. 9 above and Schöttelndreyer 1975:2). Although this is a different distinction than that between imperfective and perfective aspect used in this paper, the classification of the individual formations is for the most part analogous, i.e. all the formations with present or future meaning are dealt with by Schöttelndreyer among the “non-eventive tenses”, while on the “eventive” side, there is only the “eventive past tense” mentioned above.

In the first instance, Schöttelndreyer distinguishes between "fables and remote narratives" on the one hand and "reports" on the other. The distinction is based on several structural features, of which the most important with regard to the present problem is the marking of the event sequence. In narratives, both event-oriented and participant-oriented, the normal marking is the use of *-nok*. There is, however, a very interesting exception to this rule: one storyteller used *-surj* instead of *-nok* at the point of maximal suspense in the story (cf. Schöttelndreyer 1978:261, n. 11). This fits very well with the function of *-surj*, which is normally used for eyewitnessed events (see below): at the point of maximal suspense, the storyteller, as it were, "diminishes the distance" between the audience and the events of the story by suggesting that he has actually seen these events himself, which makes the narrative more vivid. The same phenomenon is also described for Kagate (Höhlig 1978:23ff.): at crucial points in episodes and paragraphs, the narrator may switch from the unwitnessed secondhand form to *-si*, which is functionally comparable to Sherpa *-surj*. This narrative technique is to a certain extent similar to the use of the "historical present" e.g. in Greek and Latin, but while the Greek and Latin narrator brings the events closer to the audience in time, the Tibetan narrator does so by means of evidentiality.

With reports, the situation as to the marking of the event sequence is more complicated: we have *-surj*, *-nok lwɔ*, *-yin ~ -in* and *-up dza*, which leads Schöttelndreyer to his distinction between plot-oriented or third person vs. narrator-oriented or first person reports, each subdivided into direct and indirect report. In the third person report, "direct" means that the speaker is an eyewitness of the event, whereas "indirect" means "noninvolvement of the speaker. He is not an eyewitness, but a secondhand source. The event has previously been reported to him" (p. 262).

According to Schöttelndreyer's description, then, *-surj* is used for reporting eyewitnessed events, *-nok* for fables and remote narratives, and *-nok lwɔ* (consisting of the "non-proximity" morpheme *-nok* and the secondhand marker *lwɔ*, which corresponds to *lo* in the other dialects) for indirect, i.e. non eyewitnessed third person reports. A look into the Sherpa texts published by Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973, however, shows that for the indirect third person reports, the above description is not entirely correct. There is a story of a jackal stealing radishes from an old couple, which is given in four different versions (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:82-87). One of these is rendered the way the jackal himself would tell it, and another one is told the way a fellow jackal would retell it. The comparison of these two versions makes it clear that the narrator in the secondhand report completely adopts the perspective of the original report. Where the acting jackal, in recounting his deeds, uses the

conjunct form, the fellow jackal also uses the same form and only adds the secondhand marker *lwɔ* to it, so that besides *-nok lwɔ* we find *-yi lwɔ* and *-sun lwɔ* as well. The same phenomenon can be observed in another secondhand report ("The man and the Yeti", Version B, Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:78-81) where, instead of *lwɔ*, the secondhand marking is done with *sinok* 'it is said' after every sentence. However, the use of *-nok* in this last expression and in the fables and remote narratives is enough to show that the general meaning of *-nok*, in accordance with Schöttelndreyer's description, is something like 'I haven't seen it myself, so I am not responsible for the truth of it'.

An inferential meaning of *-nok* is not mentioned by Schöttelndreyer, but clearly described in Woodbury (1986,193). Woodbury labels the past form with *-nok* "past inferential" and describes it as follows: "... the past inferential indicates that the speaker purports to base the truth of the narrated event on indirect evidence obtained in the present, or in the past after the narrated event had been completed. The evidence may be a tangible result of the narrated event from which the speaker has inferred its truth, or else hearsay." There is one use of *-nok* in the jackal story which could be explained as inferential (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:84, version B, sentence 7, my translation):

- (13) *tgmā nīŋ tɕik t̄ā ɡəl-sī tuk ràn cā dzɔk-nōk*
 then day one see go-if that only do.SIM put-PDJ
 'Then one day, when I went to look, it had been done like that'

This sentence is taken from the end of the version of the story told by the jackal himself. *-nok* in this sentence cannot indicate something that the speaker has not seen, since he is reporting the result of his investigation. But an inferential meaning is possible: the jackal had told the old couple to prepare the radishes in a way agreeable to him, to cook them and peel them etc., before planting them, pretending that otherwise they would not grow; and when he later went there again, he saw the radishes in the field, prepared in the prescribed way, and only from that did he infer that the couple had done what he had told them to do.

There is, however, one sentence in the jackal story where the use of *-nok* cannot be explained either as expressing a meaning of non-eyewitnessing or in terms of inferentiality. *-nok* occurs in the version told by the fellow jackal, in the sentence (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:86, version D, sentence 1):

- (14) *tɕiptɕaŋ-i-ki ŋɔ-la sɿ-nōk*
 jackal-one-AG I-to say-PDJ
 'A jackal told me (this)'.

In this first person sentence an eyewitnessing form would definitely be expected, but perhaps *sinōk* is used here, despite *ŋgla*, as a "frozen" formula for secondhand reports. That *sinōk* seems to be mainly used in this context appears from the fact that when 'he said' is intended to be a statement genuinely belonging to the story, this is often expressed by a slightly different form containing the same verb *si-*, namely *sica-*. Cf. sentence 3 of the jackal story, Version A (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:83):

- (15) *tuwā nandzar* "ni-w-i two dep-ki-wi" *sica-nok*
 they married two-SF-AG radish plant-AUX-FDJ say-PDJ
 'The couple said, "We are planting radishes."'

sica- and *sinōk* are combined in several sentences of the Yeti story mentioned above, e.g. in sentence 8, where the form preceding *sinōk* is *sicasurj*, because the person whose perspective the reporting speaker adopts was present when the sentence was uttered (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:78, my translation):

- (16) "...me tōŋ gə-ki-wi" *sica-surj si-nok*
 fire set must-AUX-FDJ say-PDJ say-PDJ
 "'...we must make a fire", he said [secondhand report].'

However, whereas this stereotyped *sinōk* normally follows a finite verb form (cf. example 16), it must in the case of example (14) be understood as retaining its full function as a predicate, since there is no other verb in the sentence.

There is also one instance of *-surj* which does not fit into the pattern established above (Schöttelndreyer/Schöttelndreyer 1973:85, version C, sentence 4):

- (17) *tamā tiw-i* "ni jəŋ two dep-ki-wi" *sica-surj*
 then they-AG we EMPH radish plant-AUX-FDJ say-PDJ
 'then they said, "We are going to plant radishes."'.

"They" refers to the old couple, and their utterance is directed to the jackal. The eyewitnessing form is unexpected because the speaker of *sicasurj* is not a participant in the situation, nor is this the crucial point in the story.

Among the formations of the "non-eventive tenses" mentioned by Schöttelndreyer (1975:49ff.), there are two forms with the suffix *-inok* or *-kinok*, both "impersonal" forms (i.e. which cannot be used with the first person), translated as future forms. However, Schöttelndreyer's description does not contain any information about a possible evidential meaning of these forms. This information is supplied by Woodbury (1986:190ff.), who however classes

-*inok/-kinok* not as a future, but as a habitual present formation.¹⁵ Woodbury calls this formation “habitual experiential” and describes it as indicating that “the speaker [pur]ports to see or have seen the present tense narrated event taking place, or to perceive it in some other direct way, e.g. by hearing or feeling it take place” (p. 190). This notion of direct perception contrasts with the meanings found above in the “eventive” usages in exactly the same way as described in the introductory part of this paper.¹⁶

3. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENTIAL MEANING OF 'DUG

3.1. Hypothesis about the original meaning of 'dug as an evidential auxiliary morpheme

In sections 2.1.-2.4. of this paper, we discussed the description of the functioning of 'dug in four Central Tibetan dialects. In every dialect we found the morpheme in the perfective aspect in some kind of -EVID meaning. Non-eyewitnessing as well as inferentiality are attested for Kagate and Lhomi. In Jirel, beside the non-eyewitnessing function (cf. the narrative form -*duklo*), there is possibly a resultative meaning attested in the material (see examples 7ff.), but no inferentiality. In Southern Mustang, it has been shown on the basis of some examples that the “perfect of assumption” is probably inferential. The opposite (+EVID) use of the same morpheme in the imperfective is clearly stated for Lhomi; in Kagate and Jirel, 'dug seems to exist in the imperfective as well, although a possible evidential meaning for it does not emerge from the description. However, there are further parallels for +EVID 'dug in the imperfective aspect in other dialects, e.g. Shigatse and SST (see section 3.2.1. below).

In the introduction to this paper it was proposed that the solution for the surprising opposition between the meaning of 'dug in the imperfective and perfective aspects could lie in an older inferential meaning of 'dug in the perfective. I imagine a possible development as follows: the unified original

¹⁵ It is not clear whether this difference is a matter of description, or is due to subdialectal variation. Woodbury (1986:189, n. 1) indicates that in his materials from Takshindhu, as compared with Schöttelndreyer's data from Kerung, “dialect differences are noticeable”, but he does not mention any specific features.

¹⁶ Two other forms containing -*nok* occur in Schöttelndreyer 1975. Among the examples for the “non-eventive tenses” (p. 50), there is a form *bīndūjinok* translated as ‘had been giving’. Further, -*upinok* is described by Schöttelndreyer (1975, 11ff.) for “semistative clauses”, (i.e. clauses indicating the spatial or temporal site where someone is), as in ‘once upon a time there was a Yeti’ or ‘A certain man lived in our country’. If these forms have evidential implications, this does not emerge from the description. The “inferential future” with -*up* or -*wap* and -*nok* described by Woodbury (1986, 196ff.) seems to be different from Schöttelndreyer's -*upinok*.

meaning of the evidential auxiliary morpheme 'dug in both aspects could have been 'I can see it'. This is of course not the etymological meaning of 'dug, which is 'to sit, to stay', but the evidential meaning 'I can see it' could have developed from there by 'it is (located) before my eyes'. That it is, originally, especially the visual perception (and not sensory perception in general) which is expressed by 'dug is confirmed by certain dialects like Tabo (see the contribution of Veronika Hein to this volume), where a difference between visual and non-visual sensory perception is expressed in the auxiliary morphemes, with cognates of 'dug for the visual and of *rag* 'to touch, to feel, to perceive' for the non-visual perceptions (for the function of *rak* in Southern Mustang see below, section 3.2.2.).

Now if you say 'I can see it' with reference to something which is still in progress (which is the meaning of the imperfective aspect), this means that what you see is the process or event itself. If, on the other hand, you say 'I can see it' with reference to something that has been completed in the past (which is the meaning of the perfective aspect), this means that the event must have some effect or result in the present time, since the notion of 'seeing it' can only refer to present results, but not to an action already completed. In other words, a perfective aspect in which 'dug can be used must necessarily be a resultative one. However, the fact that 'dug thus refers to the immediate visual perception of the results of the action does not exclude that the action itself has also been observed by the speaker; this is simply not expressed. This is what distinguishes a resultative meaning from an inferential one: while a resultative meaning leaves this question open, the inferential meaning necessarily implies that one has not seen the event. Cf. these observations about resultative and inferential meaning in Tournadre (1996: 238; see section 3.2.1. below):

"I propose to treat +*nok* as having a single basic evidential value which I will call IMMEDIATE EVIDENCE. ... The category of immediate evidence combines with different tenses to give more specialized evidential values. When the proposition as a whole is in the past tense, the evidence immediately perceived cannot be the event itself since it is already complete at the time of speaking. ... Accordingly, when the Sherpa immediate evidence marker +*nok* occurs with past tense propositions ... , it indicates perception of a RESULT - either tangible evidence or hearsay - of the past tense narrated event."

However, Woodbury's analysis for -*nok* differs from that proposed above for 'dug with regard to the treatment of hearsay. While I assume the hearsay meaning of 'dug to be a secondary development, Woodbury takes the inferential meaning and the hearsay meaning of -*nok* together, i.e. he treats hearsay as one

possible kind of “result” (cf. above) or “indirect evidence” (cf. his description of the “past inferential” quoted in section 2.5. above). However, he mentions (p. 193) that in many evidential systems “quotatives” marking hearsay are kept distinct from true inferentials and that in Sherpa, too, a “specifically quotative inflection” exists which he doesn’t, however, discuss (but which is presumably to be identified as the particle *lwə* dealt with in section 2.5. above).

There is another difference between the hypothesis proposed above for *’dug* and Woodbury’s description of the use of *-nok*. Woodbury points to the fact that, contrary to the meaning “immediate evidence” he proposes for *-nok*, it can also be used for information which is based on evidence obtained in the past, but after the completion of the narrated event (cf. Woodbury 1986: 196, n. 4 and 200). He takes this to be an extension of the original meaning. My example (13) illustrates exactly this type of sentence. I haven’t, however, found anything similar for *’dug*.

3.2. The assumed original meaning of ’dug and the attested aspect systems of the dialects

According to the hypothesis proposed above, the perfective aspect in which *’dug* occurs should be (or at least should originally have been) a resultative one. This is apparently not supported by the descriptions of the dialects dealt with: in Kagate, e.g., the aspect in which *-tu* is used is not described as a resultative perfect but as a “simple indefinite past which indicates that an event has been accomplished” (cf. above, section 2.1.). Therefore, it remains to show that the situation actually found in the dialects is compatible with the assumed original meaning of *’dug*. This will be done in two steps. First it will be shown that the assumed resultative meaning of *’dug* is directly attested in at least one variety of Tibetan and may be reconstructed with high probability for another variety. Second it will be shown how those functions of *’dug* that are attested in the dialects dealt with in section 2 could have developed from an original resultative meaning.

3.2.1. The resultative meaning of ’dug in Standard Spoken Tibetan and in the Shigatse dialect

There is one variety of Tibetan in which the assumed resultative meaning of *’dug* in the perfective aspect is clearly attested, namely “Standard Spoken Tibetan” (SST, as defined by Tournadre, this volume and 1996: 51). For SST, Tournadre (1996: 246ff.) distinguishes two perfective aspects called “perfect” and “aorist”. He describes the “perfect” as expressing a resultant state which is related to the moment of the utterance, or sometimes to the narrated time. The “aorist” is described as a “non-perfect” completed past, generally not

concomitant with the moment of the utterance, often associated with events viewed as a point or as a unity. In each of these aspects, there is one auxiliary morpheme with the evidential value "sensorial", which means that the speaker is or was a witness of the facts he is stating (p. 224), and one morpheme with the evidential value "assertive", which means that the speaker has not stated himself the facts he is talking about, but that his statement is based on a generally accepted truth or on reported information that he does not (p. 227).¹⁷ The respective morphemes are *'dug* (sensorial) and *yod red* (assertive) for the perfect, *song* (sensorial) and *pa red* (assertive) for the aorist (see Table 3 below).

With regard to the overall structure of aspects, the description of the dialect of Shigatse by Haller (2000; cf. also his contribution to this volume) is very similar to Tournadre's description of SST quoted above. Haller distinguishes two perfective aspects called "perfective I" and "perfective II". The difference between the two aspects is described as follows (91ff.): both are past forms expressing perfectivity; "perfective I" additionally expresses that the effect of the described fact is still continuing in the present. With regard to the evidentiality opposition, the two terms "evidential" and "non-evidential" are used. "Evidential" means that the speaker directly perceives the event (Haller 2000, 89). (For Shigatse, "evidential" is thus used with approximately the same meaning as +EVID in my paper. I will follow Felix Haller's terminology wherever Shigatse is concerned.)

Thus, the categories established by Tournadre (1996) for SST and by Haller (2000) for Shigatse are roughly equivalent in meaning. However, the morphemes used in the two dialects are different, as shown in the following table:

Shigatse	Pfv I	Pfv II	SST	Perfect	Aorist
nvol.evid	<i>-ne</i>	<i>-so</i>	sensorial	<i>'dug</i>	<i>song</i>
nvol.nevid	<i>-joapie</i>	<i>-papie</i>	assertive	<i>yod red</i>	<i>pa red</i>

Table 3. Some evidential auxiliary morphemes of the Shigatse dialect and SST

In connection with the topic of this paper, the Shigatse morpheme corresponding in function to SST *'dug* is especially important. As the table shows, it is *-ne*.¹⁸ However, it is very probable that *-ne* is not the oldest

¹⁷ Besides these two morphemes expressing the evidentiality opposition, there are other auxiliary morphemes in both aspects, which are not relevant in the context of this paper and therefore not discussed (cf. n. 2). The same is true for the description of Shigatse (see below).

¹⁸ The etymology of *-ne* is not clear. As Felix Haller informs me, there is a morpheme *-nə* in Themchen, which however is not exactly parallel, since it occurs only as the first part of

morpheme used in this function in Shigatse; rather, it seems that *-ne* is replacing *'dug*, as in negative sentences *-mītu* (consisting of the negative particle and a morpheme cognate to WT *'dug*) appears. The hypothesis that *'dug* was formerly in use in Shigatse and is now gradually disappearing is further supported by the situation found in the imperfective aspect, where the “evidential” morpheme *-ki* is matched by *kīmītu* in negative sentences. The falling tone of *-ki* may be interpreted as an indication that something has been lost; that the lost element is *'dug* is very probable considering the corresponding negative form quoted above, and it is further supported by the parallel situation in SST, where Tournadre 1996, 225ff. describes the “sensorial” morpheme *gi* (*'dug*) used in the imperfective aspect, with *'dug* bracketed because often only *gi* is spoken.

Therefore, we may safely assume that Shigatse formerly used the morpheme *'dug* to express the “evidential” meaning in the “perfective I”, which means that *'dug* occurred in exactly the same position within the system of aspect and evidentiality as it still does in SST.

In SST, *'dug* occurs in the perfect, which according to Tournadre's description is clearly resultative (see above). Further, SST *'dug* is classed as “sensorial”, which agrees with the fact that the results of an event are immediately perceived. As for the event itself, perception of it is not excluded when *'dug* is used, but the emphasis lies on the resultant state (cf. Tournadre 1996: 238). There is another morpheme in SST, namely *bzhag*, which Tournadre describes as inferential, i.e. as excluding perception of the event. However, the fact that the resultative and the inferential meaning are very closely related to each other (“pratiquement équivalente[s]”, Tournadre *ibid.*; see also section 3.1. above) is confirmed by the SST usage of the two morphemes, since the Tibetan speakers, according to Tournadre, generally do not make a distinction between *'dug* and *bzhag*, and *bzhag* is more and more used to indicate a simple perfect (Tournadre 1996:237), thus apparently tending to replace *'dug*. This tendency of replacement is further confirmed by the fact that there is at least one case in which *bzhag* is matched in negative sentences by *'dug*, namely in the combination with *red* described by Tournadre 1996:238 (cf. the Shigatse situation with regard to *dug* and *-ne*, discussed above).

It is important to note that in SST and Shigatse, the manner of perception expressed by *'dug* (and by its equivalent *-ne*) is not restricted to seeing (cf. the definitions of “sensorial” and “evidential” quoted above), though for SST seeing is mentioned as the most frequent case (Tournadre 1996:224). There is, however, no difficulty in assuming that the meaning “sensory perception in

general" is an extension of the meaning "visual perception", which, as argued above (section 3.1.), is assumed to be the original meaning of 'dug.

If we now look at *song*, which in the dialects discussed in section 2 appeared as the +EVID counterpart to 'dug, we find that in Shigatse and SST it is classed as "perfective II" or "aorist", and as "evidential" or "sensorial" respectively. Thus, in these systems, *song* is opposed to 'dug (and to Shigatse *-ne*) not with respect to its evidential meaning, but to its aspect: *song* means that the speaker has perceived the event as a whole,¹⁹ 'dug and *-ne* mean that he is perceiving its results (or that the results are what he insists on perceiving, cf. above).

The place of 'dug in the aspect system of Shigatse and SST thus corresponds exactly to what was assumed as its original function in the hypothesis proposed above (section 3.1.): it expresses perception (though not only visual perception) of the result of an event. It remains to be shown that the same meaning of 'dug may be assumed to have existed at a former time also in the other dialects discussed.

3.2.2. Possible development of 'dug in the other dialects

In the discussion below the function of 'dug in the synchronic aspect systems of Jirel, Kagate, Lhomi and Southern Mustang will be pointed out and brought into relation with its assumed original meaning. However, within the scope of this paper it will not be possible to go into the history of the respective aspect systems as a whole or into the history of the other morphemes involved, since too many questions still remain to be investigated in that area.

First, let us consider the systems of Jirel and Kagate, where apparently there is only one perfective aspect. (In the case of Kagate, this might however be due to the fact that Höhlig's paper does not contain a complete description of the language.) Within this perfective aspect, Kagate *-tu* and Jirel *-duklo* are opposed, with regard to evidentiality, to Kagate *-si* and Jirel *-surj*, respectively. (The function of *-duk* without *-lo* in Jirel is not clear, cf. section 2.4.) On the assumption that the evidential meaning of Kagate *-si*, which is a cognate of WT *zin* 'to be finished', is comparable to the evidential meaning of *song* (cf. n. 19), the development in these dialects could be outlined as follows: originally *song* and *zin* meant 'I saw the whole event', 'dug meant 'I can see its results'. But as soon as 'dug came to mean 'I did not see the event itself' (as proposed in 3.1.), it became directly opposed to *song* and *zin*. The fact that there is only one perfective aspect in these dialects could well be the result of this development of the meaning of 'dug, since it thereby lost its resultative character. However, we

¹⁹ Again there is (cf. section 3.1. for 'dug) a recognizable relation between the etymological meaning of the word and its use as an evidential morpheme: *song* literally means 'went', thus expressing that the narrated event as a whole is, at the time of speaking, a past event.

do not know if there were, at a former stage, additional morphemes in these dialects, and, if so, when and why they were lost.

In Lhomi, the functions of the three morphemes *-sorj*, *-tuk* and *-pa pɛt* in the synchronic system are distributed as follows: *-sorj* is used for reporting eyewitnessed events, *-tuk* is used for reporting inferred information, and *-pa pɛt* indicates that the speaker has heard about the events from an eyewitness. In this system, *-sorj* corresponds in meaning to what would be expected according to the assumed original distribution, while *-tuk* has changed from 'I can see the results' to 'I can see the results only and I infer the event'. A trace of the resultative aspect of *'dug* may perhaps be found in the fact that *-tuk* is described by Vesalainen/Vesalainen (1980:100) as "stativizing" a clause (for the term, see n. 9). The emphasis seems to lie on the resultant state and not on the event.

In historical narratives, *-pa pɛt* and *-tuk* undergo a further change of meaning, with *-pa pɛt* then indicating 'I believe in the truth of the events I am reporting' and *-tuk* indicating 'I don't take any responsibility for the truth of the events I am reporting'. The difference between the main function described for Lhomi and the "narrative meaning" is not very striking in the case of *-pa pɛt*: what the narrator implies is that to him the events he is reporting are as trustworthy as if he had an eyewitness report for them. The shift of meaning which *-tuk* undergoes is, as stated above (section 2.3.), more surprising at first sight, because a morpheme normally implying the speaker's own perception (viz. of the results of an event) is, in the narratives, used to express the more reserved attitude of the speaker, i.e. his wish to take no responsibility for the truth of the narrative. But, as stated above (section 3.1) the evidentiality status of inferential contexts is inherently ambiguous, and the Lhomi use of *-tuk* can be explained as a full exploitation of this ambiguity. In the "non-narrative use" of *-tuk*, the emphasis lies on the speaker's own perception of the results, from which he infers what has happened, while in the "narrative use", the emphasis lies on the fact that the speaker has not himself observed the events and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for their truth.

In Southern Mustang, there are four morphemes, probably all etymologically corresponding to those in SST, namely *-sunj*, *-tuk*, *-wa rək*²⁰ and *əta rək*.²¹

²⁰ *-wa rək* is my representation, for the sake of visualizing the structural parallel to SST *pa red*. Kretschmar describes this formation as "perfect participle plus *rək* or *nək*" (see section 2.2.), but what she calls "perfect participle" is etymologically the same formation with the "nominalizing particle" WT *pa/ba* that we also find in SST. In Southern Mustang, WT *pa/ba* appears as *-a*, *-wa* or (in the case of "inherent final -t") *-ta* with the present/future stem, and as *-pa* or (more commonly) *-wa* with the past stem (cf. Kretschmar 1995/1:139). The correspondence between *rək* and *red* is phonologically possible, since *red* is phonologically represented by Tournadre (1996:227) as /re/, i.e. there is no dental stop in the pronunciation. (In WT, too, *red* and *reg* can be viewed as younger spellings for *ræg*.)

However, they are distributed to the aspects in another way than in SST (cf. Table 3 above): in Southern Mustang, *-surj* and *-tuk* belong to the "perfect", which is described as resultative, while *-wa rak* and *əta rak* belong to the "preterite" or "durative preterite" respectively, with the "preterite" being described as the simple narrative form. Thus, in contrast to the SST system, we find the +EVID morphemes in the "perfect", the -EVID ones in the "preterite". That the SST system probably reflects the more original distribution is, as far as the +EVID morphemes are concerned, supported by the parallel usage of the same morphemes in Shigatse (cf. section 3.2.1. above) and, for *song*, also in Lhomi (section 2.3.). However, an attempt to explain the unexpected distribution in Southern Mustang would take us beyond the topic of this paper. Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to examining the synchronic function of the morphemes in order to define the position of *-tuk* in this system.

-wa rak has, in Southern Mustang, taken over the function for which in some of the other dialects 'dug (or 'dug lo) came to be used, namely the narrative function.

əta rak is synchronically used in the same context as *-wa rak*, i.e. in a narrative function. Checking the contexts of Kretschmar's examples for *əta rak*, I found that it is used to describe those circumstances which are the background for the next event to be narrated.²² Consider, e.g., the following sentence (Kretschmar 1995/1:154ff and 3:107ff):

- (18) *ontī* *jul-kō-rū* *təhū* *təh̄y* *ətā rak*
 that village-DEF-DAT water.ABS scoop DUR.PRET
 'In that village, (a girl) was scooping water.'

A monkey has just arrived in the village and finds the girl there. In the next sentence, he will talk to her.

As for *-surj* and *-tuk*, both of these morphemes originally expressed a kind of visual perception: in one case of the event, in the other of its result. But in Southern Mustang, *-surj*, has also come to belong to the resultative "perfect". Its meaning must thereby have changed to something like 'I have seen the event, and there I can still see its results', opposed to *-tuk* 'I can see only the results and I infer the event'. Consider, besides examples (1) and (2) above, the following pair of sentences (Kretschmar 1995/1:157ff):

²¹ Besides *əta rak*, there are also *əta nak* and *ə* alone (cf. section 2.2.). For this paper, however, only the meaning of *əta rak* has been investigated in the stories, since this is the formation directly comparable to SST.

²² On rough checking, I have the impression that in Shigatse, *-joapie* is used in a similar manner when it occurs in stories. However, in the case of *əta rak*, this narrative function seems to be the only one synchronically existing, since *əta rak* is (for second and third persons, cf. section 2.2.) described exclusively as a "durative preterite", with "preterite" being defined as the narrative tense.

- (19) *kʰō-kī* *kə* *pē-sūŋ*
 he-ERG door.ABS open-PF.OBS
 'He has/had opened the door' (observation)
- (20) *kʰō-kī* *kə* *pē-rūk*
 he-ERG door.ABS open-PF.ASS
 'idem' (assumption)

If the interpretation proposed above for the meaning opposition between *-sūŋ* and *-tuk* inside the "perfect" is correct, then example (19) should mean 'I have seen him open the door, and the door is still open', whereas (20) should mean 'I can see that the door is open and I infer that he must have opened it'. Thus, the development of *-tuk* from a resultative to a purely inferential morpheme in Southern Mustang is easily understood, considering that it stands in opposition to *-sūŋ*, which on account of its original "aoristic" aspect tends to include perception of the event in its evidential meaning. This is, in a way, the counterpart to what has been said above about a possible development in Jirel. For Jirel, it was argued that *'dug* developed to a meaning of 'not having seen the event' and thereby came to be opposed to *song*, losing in consequence its resultative aspect. For Southern Mustang, the line of reasoning is that the meaning of *-sūŋ*, as soon as it became opposed to *-tuk* inside the "perfect", caused *-tuk* to become inferential. The reason for the different assumptions lies in the different results of the developments: in Jirel, the remaining perfective aspect is used for recounting completed events, while in Southern Mustang, *sūŋ* and *-tuk* belong to the resultative "perfect", besides which there are the two narrative forms containing *ṛak*.

We have now completed the discussion of a possible development of *'dug* in Jirel, Kagate, Lhomi, and Southern Mustang, and have hopefully shown that in each case, the functions of *'dug* in the synchronic system can be plausibly derived from an original resultative meaning of the morpheme. Further, we have found a resultative meaning of *'dug* attested in SST, and reconstructed it with high probability for a former stage of the Shigatse dialect. Therefore, the hypothesis proposed in section 3.1. seems to be sufficiently supported by the facts presented and discussed in this paper.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABS	absolute case
AG	agent
ASS	assumption
AUX	auxiliary
COND	conditional
CONS	consecutive action
CONV	converbal suffix
DEF	definite article
DUR	durative
EMPH	emphasis word and affix
ERG	ergative case
EVID	evidential (used for Shigatse, equivalent in meaning to +EVID)
+EVID	"+ evidential" (as defined in the beginning of the paper)
-EVID	"- evidential" (as defined in the beginning of the paper)
F	focus affix (attributive marker)
FDJ	future disjunct
FUT	future
IMP	imperative
LOC	location and direction: at/to (across, general)
N	Nepali loanword
NEG	negative, negation
NEVID	non-evidential (used for Shigatse, equivalent to -EVID)
NVOL	non-volitional (as defined by Felix Haller, this volume)
OBS	observation, observed
PDJ	past disjunct
PF	perfect
PFV	perfective
PRET	preterite
RI	reported information marker
SF	stem formative
SIM	simultaneous action
WT	Written Tibetan

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